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This dissertation implements a structural credit risk model to predict the probabilities of default 
for the eight largest retail banks in the United States. Similar to Goldstein, Ju, and Leland 
(2001), the model implemented in this dissertation relates the project/asset value with the firm 
capacity to generate earnings. Most papers in the literature consider that firms have fixed 
financial costs and that shareholders decide whenever to liquidate the firm based on the distance 
between some underlying earnings measure and these fixed costs. This assumption is not 
reasonable in the case of banks. As an alternative to incorporate shareholders strategic default 
decision, non-financial fixed costs are considered. These non-financial fixed costs are defined 
as the non-interest expenses and proxy the operational leverage of the bank. The analysed 
sample period contains 19 consecutive years, covering the dotcom crisis, the financial crisis 
and several minor crises in between. The model was calibrated by applying the iterative 
approach proposed by Vassalou and Xing (2004). The average computed probability of default 
for the whole sector ranged between 0.06% in 2006 and 5.80% during the financial crisis. These 
results were compared with the probabilities of default and the distances-to-default implied by 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s credit ratings for the period between 2006 and 2018. Though 
the probabilities of default show a low not significant correlation, the distances-to-default have 
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Esta tese implementa um modelo estruturado de risco de crédito para prever as probabilidades 
de falência dos oito maiores bancos comerciais nos Estados Unidos. Com base no trabalho de 
Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001), o modelo implementado compara o valor do projeto/ativo com 
a capacidade da empresa de gerar receitas. A maioria da literatura considera que as empresas 
têm custos financeiros fixos e que os acionistas decidem liquidar a empresa sempre que se 
verificar uma determinada diferença entre as receitas e estes custos fixos. Esta premissa, no 
entanto, não é razoável no caso dos bancos. Como alternativa para a decisão estratégica dos 
acionistas de liquidar o banco, são também considerados custos fixos não-financeiros. Estes 
custos são definidos como despesas sem juros, representando um valor aproximado da 
alavancagem operacional do banco. O período analisado é composto por 19 anos consecutivos, 
cobrindo principalmente a crise da bolha da internet e a crise financeira de 2007/08. O modelo 
foi construído aplicando a abordagem sugerida por Vassalou e Xing (2004). A probabilidade 
média de falir calculada varia entre 0.06% em 2006 e 5.80% durante a crise financeira. Estes 
resultados foram comparados com as probabilidades de falência e distâncias para a falência 
calculadas pela Moody’s e Standard & Poor’s para o período entre 2006 e 2018. Apesar das 
probabilidades de falência demostrarem uma correlação baixa e não significante, as distâncias 
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Banks mainly generate earnings from three different sources. First, through the so-called 
interest rate margin. The main task of a retail bank is to collect deposits, for which they pay 
interest, and to grant credit to customers, to which they charge interest. This difference is 
expectedly positive. Second, banks charge commissions on their payment services or similar. 
Third, banks earn interest and dividends from investing in government or rated assets. The 
business model just described leaves banks exposed to a variety of different sources of risk. 
Three in particular, notably, credit, liquidity risk and market risk. Credit risk is defined as the 
risk that emerges from customers that are unable to repay their loan or contractual obligations 
towards the bank. Once this risk materialises it includes lost principal and interest, while 
increasing collection costs for the bank. Especially during the subprime crisis many banks 
suffered from significant losses through loans towards high-risk borrowers. These were caused 
by subprime mortgage borrowers. This can be measured by banks stating it as a “loss given 
default”, which monitors the amount that got lost due to the default. The liquidity risk emerges 
from maturity transformation, which appears from the different maturity characteristics of 
deposits and loans. Short-term deposits are used to create long-term loans, which limit the banks 
financial resources in the case that depositors want to take their money out. Market risk emerges 
from the investing of some of the retail banks liquidity in bonds and other tradable securities, 
like government bonds or similar low-risk assets. Banks are measuring their market risk by 
using the value-at-risk (VaR) approach. It can be defined as the maximal value that a portfolio 
can suffer from and is known as one of the predominant risk management approaches used by 
banks (Berkowitz and O’Brien, 2002). Even though these are generally perceived as low-risk 
assets they increase their exposure to the market and create market risk. Operating risk can arise 
from employee errors, fraud or events that disrupt the production process. These can cause 
losses for the company. The economy is in demand of capital, which can cause banks to develop 
risk-taking incentives, which can be a problem in combination with the naturally low level of 
equity hold. The amount of capital held by a bank is measuring the potential amount a bank can 
absorb. Due to an increase in the return on equity that banks can achieve by using debt instead, 
the banks are holding only a low amount of capital. Debt is cheaper than equity, because the 
level of equity in a company can only be increased by retaining profits, decreasing dividend 
payments or buying shares back. Banks prefer not to use these options as they are not in line 
with shareholders wants or highly costly. Consequently, regulators aim to increase this low 
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level of capital to prevent bailouts paid by taxpayers as the capital is used to absorb losses when 
risks materialise.   
Given that banks have a critical role in the economy and the risks that they face, they are 
regulated institutions. These regulations are intended to work as a framework to create a safer 
environment for companies and prevent financial crises. These regulations contain capital 
requirements that must be fulfilled by banks to be allowed to operate. In the last years, buffer 
requirements for cyclical risk were also added to the regulatory framework. This risk emerges 
from the cyclical peaks and downturns, which can have a significant effect on the business 
cycles of companies. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that these regulations are supposed to work 
as a financial cushion towards losses and prevent banks from overly taking risk into their books, 
but they don’t guarantee that a bank cannot go bankrupt.  
Several methodologies were proposed to measure the probability of banks going bankrupt. One 
of those methodologies are structural credit risk models. Structural credit risk models can be 
applied to overcome some of the previously defined shortcomings of traditional risk 
management metrics and models to predict the probabilities of default of financial institutions. 
Structural models use market data, which allow them to create forward-looking results. 
Consequently, this type of data enables the model to predict with a higher rate of precision and 
a more market realistic way.  
Credit risks’ close link towards default caught up the interest of many researchers and 
academics. For this reason, we are applying a structural model to analyse their exposure towards 
risk and analyse the likelihoods of default during times of crisis. In comparison to the previously 
mentioned approaches, structural models are very complex and difficult to successfully apply 
to financial institutions from an empirical perspective. Nevertheless, this dissertation aims 
towards the implementation of a structural model to predict the probabilities of default for the 
financial sector in the United States. In order to achieve this, a data set that contains 19 years 
of data from the eight largest retail banks in the United States is analysed. The model 
implemented in this dissertation is a modified version of the static Goldstein, Ju, Leland (2001) 
model, which is an EBIT-based structural model. This model finds application in the prediction 
process of the probabilities of default of these companies and therefore can retrieve information 
about their performance during the dotcom-crisis, the financial crisis of 2008, and an increase 
around 2014 – 2015 due to market changes. Throughout this time period, it was possible to 
retrieve information about the performance of the eight largest retail banks in the United States, 
which are an employer for many people and financial providers for a whole nation, that almost 
went bankrupt or that had to be bailed out. Finally, the probabilities retrieved from the GJL 
 11 
(2001)-model were compared with the implied probabilities of default from the credit ratings 
of professional agencies. Further, the probabilities of default were used to compute the DD’s 
and compare these with the rating implied ones by applying an InverseNormal function.  
The structure of the dissertation is following the order of: Chapter 2 – Literature Review, 
Chapter 3 –Model, Chapter 4 – Data Inputs and Model calibration, Chapter 5 – Results, and 
finally in Chapter 6 – Conclusion.  
  
 12 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Structural models  
The application of structural credit risk models can be traced back to the pioneering papers of 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). In these papers corporate securities are seen as 
contingent claims on a firm’s underlying assets. In the beginning, the pioneering paper of Black 
and Scholes (1973) first proposed an explicit formula to price call options on common stocks. 
Following joint work with Merton they also stated that in the hypothetical case of a company 
that issued a single pure discount bond and has a predetermined liquidation date, equity can be 
seen as a call option on the firm assets with strike equal to nominal liabilities. Thus, the Black-
Scholes formulas could be used to price stocks. Therefore, this framework could be used to 
measure the value of equity. While the debt can be valued by applying put-call parity. This 
makes debt a covered call or something equivalent to a risk-free loan implied by a short put 
option. The put premium in this case can be understood as a compensation for the default risk. 
From this on it is possible to compute the probabilities of default with this framework. These 
are defined as the probability with which the company is unable to meet their outstanding 
financial obligations (Merton, 1974). The Black-Scholes formula used the market value of 
assets, the asset volatility, the risk-free rate, time-to-maturity, and the face value of debt as the 
strike price of the option (Black & Scholes 1973). This approach to measure credit risk became 
known as the Merton model. The usage of market data enables the prediction of forward-
looking results and therefore are one of the main advantages of structural credit risk models.  
Black and Cox (1976) improved on Merton’s model by disbanding the assumption that 
companies can only default once outstanding debt matures. In their model the company defaults 
when the asset value passes a certain barrier the first time. They justify that default can occur 
at any point in time with the company not being able to meet its collateral agreements. The 
possibility of early default makes the model more realistic. They were the first ones to propose 
the “first passage time model”. Everything else equal, the introduction of the possibility of early 
default leads to an increase in the chances of the firm defaulting. However, in contrast to Merton 
model where the asset value of a company can sink to any level before the debt is maturing, in 
Black-Cox debt holders’ losses are capped by the recovered value at the barrier (Black & Cox, 
1976).  
A more complex approach was proposed by Geske (1977). In this paper, every time a payment 
is due shareholders have to decide whether or not do default. Shareholders exercise the option 
to stay when the asset values are at a significantly high level, which makes it possible to raise 
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new equity and continue with the payments to creditors. In contrast, they abandon the firm when 
the asset value is reaching a predefined low level where it is not possible to raise enough equity 
to meet the financial obligations to the creditors. The latter leads to the takeover of the 
company's assets by the creditors (Imerman, 2011). This approach was first proposed by Geske 
and further developed by Geske and Johnson (1984). This mechanism can further be compared 
to the one of compound options. These are defined as an option, which underlying asset is also 
an option. Therefore, these obtains can widely be applied through the possible combinations of 
call and put options. The advantage of this is that the bank got an exposure towards the 
underlying option now, but by hedging the exposure due to long-term costs of paying for the 
option now. Companies can therefore use these options while planning on costly projects and 
secure financial sources before going into the project. If they are unable to realize the project, 
they just lose their exposure towards the option, but without initiating costs of financing the 
unrealized project. Hence, financial institutions gain a sort of insurance policy from using 
compound options (Geske, 1979). 
As this dissertation is about the computation of probabilities of default as important indicators 
in credit risk models it is essential to mention the paper about public firm expected default 
frequency (EDF), authored by Sun, Munves, and Hamilton (2012). Their paper follows the 
analytical calculation approach of default frequencies and their model belongs to the class of 
structural credit risk models. Their approach contains the distance-to-default (DD) which is of 
special interest for this dissertation. This approach first got proposed by Moody’s KMV 
expected default frequency risk calculation model (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). It represents a 
count of standard deviations that the asset value is away from financial distress, while assuming 
that there is a normal distribution. Hence, the distance-to-default can be seen as a market-based 
approach of corporate default risk, due to his inputs of the market value of the asset, the default 
point and the asset volatility. The measure captures macro-economic and firm-specific events 
in a closed-form solution, which can be seen as an advantage towards the classic Merton model 
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). They define the numerator as the difference between the logarithm 
of the asset value and the logarithm of the default point, which captures the firms' leverage. 
Meanwhile, the denominator discounts the leverage of the firm by asset volatility and therefore 
captures the denominator. Further, it can capture the overall risk level through the asset 
volatility. This formula can be used as a base to enhance the amount of credit risk parameters 
in a dissertation, which is using market information. The usage of market information allows 
forward-looking solutions towards default risk.  
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Brockman and Turtle (2003) proposed in their paper another approach using a barrier. In their 
paper, they proposed to use the down-and-out call (DOC) valuation model of Merton (1974). 
The DOC framework works through exercising the call option once the barrier is hit and 
therefore terminates the company transferring the asset values from asset ownership to creditors 
(Brockman and Turtle, 2003). They find that this implication of a barrier leads to dominating 
results compared to the accounting-based approach of Altman Z-scores in almost all of their 
7,787 firm-years tested.  
In addition to the previously mentioned papers, there is a vast literature determined towards 
structural models that cover important corporate finance questions. These papers should be 
mentioned as well, due to their assumptions and findings. These can further be used to enhance 
structural models for the computation of default probabilities.   
In the paper of Leland (1994), tax rates and bankruptcy costs are introduced, which allows the 
author to analyse the optimal capital question. In this model they assume that the shareholders 
set an endogenous threshold barrier at the lowest asset value where equity is still positive. The 
model assumes one class of debt with a fixed coupon and an infinite maturity. Once the asset 
value of the bank is reaching the barrier the shareholders make the strategical decision to default 
the company.  
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland proposed a model that is using a cash flow-based approach to predict 
the optimal capital structure in a dynamic setting (i.e. they consider the possibility of issuing 
further debt in the future). They state that most models are limited by a static capital structure, 
while assuming a dynamic capital structure has significant effects on the amount of initial debt 
issued and the risk linked to these bond issuing companies. They assume that companies, in 
reality, adjust their debt levels with changing firm values and therefore tackle these previous 
assumptions (Goldstein, Ju, Leland, 2001). 
The Leland- and the GJL-model are two examples of especially interesting corporate finance 
papers that can provide important insights to the measure of probabilities of default.  
 
2.2 Structural models applications to the banking sector 
Some papers using structural models focus on the banking sector.  
Episcopos (2007) adapts the model proposed by Brockman and Turtle (2003) to the banking 
sector. This paper finds that their barrier option model is useful for bank regulators. 
Stockholders are left behind with a down-and-out call option, which leads to a decrease in their 
incentive to increase asset risk. As an increase in the regulatory barrier leads to a wealth transfer 
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from shareholders to in their case the federal deposit insurance corporation. This can be 
understood as a management tool for a deposit insurance premium schedule (Episcopos, 2007). 
The model assumes closure barriers to become trivial, while the down-and-in option works as 
a prompt corrective action (PCA). Thus, the barriers can be used as policy tools for banks and 
other financial institutions to meet capital requirements and restrictions from regulators 
(Episcopos, 2007). 
Further, Flannery (2005) assumed in his work that asset values follow different stochastic 
processes. This could be taken into account for inputs in structural models to compute more 
realistic results. Assets following this assumption could increase the analysing power of banks 
capital structure works in times of financial crisis and how the valuation of contingent capital 
is affected by declines in the asset value, as more extreme events could be captured. This 
assumption could be applied to predict default probabilities through a structural model and 
retrieve information about the difference in their performance.  
Following the previous assumption of asset values that follow different stochastic processes, 
Pennacchi (2010) stated the assumption that banks asset values follow a jump-diffusion process, 
while the bank issues short-term deposits, shareholder’s equity, and fixed- or floating-coupon 
contingent capital bonds (Pennacchi, 2010). The papers goal is to find evidence about the 
pricing mechanism of contingent capital in times of financial distress and how credit spreads 
are evolving at this time in the case of issuing banks. Further, they explore the risk-taking 
incentives of banks that issue several forms of contingent claims compared to banks that offer 
non-convertible subordinated debt. They find that banks that issue contingent capital are more 
likely to face moral hazard incentives to increase their asset's jump risk. In addition, they find 
that contingent capital is a feasible and cost-saving opportunity to mitigate financial distress 
when it is targeted to transform at an early stage (Pennacchi, 2010). 
First of all, the implication of a jump-diffusion process, which permits sudden declines in asset 
values, led to contingent claims, that normally would have been risk-free or contain zero credit 
spreads, becoming positive. This provides more realistic results in times of crisis. They find 
that credit spreads of contingent claims tend to have an inverse relationship with the bank's 
capital, which can be explained through the closer range to conversion. Regarding the risk-
taking incentive, they couldn't find evidence that a bank is issuing contingent capital to transfer 
value from contingent claims investors to banks shareholders because this incentive is given 
when issuing comparable subordinated debt as well (Penachhi, 2010). Even though earnings 
that follow a jump-diffusion process can monitor sudden declines in a better way, the 
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geometric-Brownian motion process, that is used by a lot of models, is also able to display 
declines realistically.   
Due to the increasing connection of the global economy and the key role financial institutions 
take in this, it is important to predict future probabilities of default with a high level of precision. 
Even non-systemic crises can cause high costs for the public through bailouts of companies, 
that are defined to be systematic. Consequently, structural models can also be used to predict 
the likelihood with which banks are in need of a bail-out and the costs linked to these. Correia, 
Dubiel-Teleszynsky, and Población (2017) applied a Leland (1994)-style model, as it allows to 
model a more realistic approach and has the advantage of cash flows as an observable variable 
and the opportunity to model changes in the tax rate. Therefore, their model can indicate times 
with higher likelihoods of default and the costs that would occur out of it. These findings could 
help governments to work out regulations to increase their performance in a crisis. They find 
that the main costs of banking bailouts are caused by equity injections, deposit insurances and 
loan guarantees (Correia, Dubiel-Teleszynsky & Población, 2017). 
Structural models can further be used towards the pricing of hybrid securities. These represent 
an important way for banks to raise capital in times of liquidity and/or market risk. The so-
called reverse convertible debentures (RCD) could be analysed in future literature towards its 
effect to lower probabilities of default. This financial instrument would automatically convert 
into common equity once a market capital ratio of a bank reached a predetermined level. The 
current stock market price is used when the RCD converts, which hands over the full cost to 
shareholders, as a price of their risk-taking decision (Flannery, 2005). Structural models could 
therefore also be used to pursue the likelihood of a government bailout and therefore be in the 
interest of national supervisors. Further research could implement this kind of financial 
instrument towards a structural model and predict their efficiency to reduce the probabilities of 
default. In the case that good results, the government could create regulations towards banks to 
require them to hold a specific amount of these instruments like a capital requirement does for 
equity. 
Additionally to the previous findings for hybrid securities, they seem to be a lower-cost 
alternative towards equity allowing for tax advantages (Barucci & Del Viva, 2013). Barucci 
and Del Viva apply an option pricing formula for contingent convertible-bonds (Coco-bonds). 
These provide financial services for banks, deleverage bank's balance sheets in times of high 
financial risk and reduce the expected bankruptcy costs while increasing the stability of the 
financial sector. Therefore, this financial instrument can reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy 
significantly in times of financial crisis. Overall they state that this instrument provides a lower 
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bankruptcy barrier and lower bankruptcy costs. Even though the instrument can do this for a 
company it comes at the cost of a higher yield spread of callable bonds, which is equivalent to 
an increase in the insurance premium (Barucci & Del Viva, 2013). Hence, several more 
instruments could be tested by structural models to predict if they can actively lower the 
probabilities of default for retail banks.    
 18 
3. Model 
The model used in this dissertation is largely based on the static version of Goldstein, Ju and 
Leland (2001) EBIT-based structural model. In this chapter, this model is explained in-depth 
and followed by a part about the calibrations of the model that were applied.  
 
3.1 EBIT-based Model (Goldstein, Ju, Leland, 2001) 
Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) assume that a company holds a project that generates a payout 
flow. The dynamics of this payout flow under measure P are given by1  
Equation 1 
     
𝑑𝛿
𝛿
= 𝜇𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧,      
where 𝜇𝑝 and 𝜎 are constants. Here, 𝜇𝑝, describes the drift of the project, while 𝜎 describes the 
volatility of the project returns. This equation is stated under the physical measure P. The 
physical measure P is true probability measure, which needs to be used to predict the 
probabilities of default later on. By discounting all expected future earnings flows at a certain 
constant discount rate, the project value can be obtained. Precisely, the value of the claim to the 
earnings flow is 
Equation 2 





      =
𝛿𝑡
𝑟−𝜇
,       
where 𝜇 = (𝜇𝑃 − 𝜃𝜎) is usually called the risk-neutral drift and 𝑟 describes the risk-free rate. 
Both are assumed to be constant. 𝜃 is the market price of risk. The market price of risk is the 
compensation that investors require to invest in a certain project by a unit of risk. The risk 
premium is described by 𝜃𝜎. By applying Ito’s lemma to the previously defined project value 
function, one can obtain the project value dynamics. This can be written under measure P 








                                                 
1 A probability measure is a function that gives probabilities to states of the world.  
2 Measure Q is an alternative probability measure. Similar to measure P, measure Q gives probabilities to states 





= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧𝑄. 
It is clear from equation 1 and 3a that V and 𝛿 share the same dynamics under measure P (i.e. 
both follow a geometric Brownian motion with drift 𝜇𝑃 and volatility𝜎). The same is true under 
measure Q. 
 
Now, define the project payout ratio k as the ratio of the payout flow and the project value. In 





= 𝑟 − 𝜇. 
By rearranging equation 4, we can obtain the following:  
Equation 5 
𝜇 = 𝑟 − 𝑘. 




= (𝑟 − 𝑘)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡𝑊𝑡
𝑄
. 
The value of any contingent claim on this asset can be found by solving the below partial 
differential equation (PDE): 
Equation 7 
(𝑟 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐹𝑣 +
𝜎2
2
𝑉2𝐹𝑉𝑉 + 𝐹𝑡 + 𝑃 = 𝑟𝑓, 
where P in this case is defined as the payout flow specific to the contract we want to price. In 
the case of time independent securities, this PDE reduces to a second-order ordinary differential 
equation (ODE):   
Equation 8 
0 = (𝑟 − 𝑘)𝑉𝐹𝑣 +
𝜎2
2
𝑉2𝐹𝑉𝑉 + 𝐹𝑡 + 𝑃 − 𝑟𝑓, 
We are interested in finding a pricing function (called F function in this case) that fulfils the 
condition given by equation 8 and the characteristics of the contract we want to price. The 
solution to equation 8 is generally found as the sum of the general solution to the homogenous 
equation, where the payout associated with the claim is equal to zero (i.e. P=0), and adding a 
particular solution. This particular solution depends on the contract we want to price. In our 
model, we will assume that the firm defaults whenever V falls to a certain level, hereafter 
denominated as 𝑉𝐵. This value is also called the default barrier and establishes an important 
condition to obtain the pricing of all securities we are interested. 
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In the case of a security that entitles its owner to all future payout flows, we call the F function 
as 𝑉𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣 and it can be shown that V is a particular solution. As a result, 𝑉𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣 can be shown to 
be given by.  
Equation 12 
𝑉𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣 = 𝑉 + 𝐴1𝑉
−𝑦 + 𝐴2𝑉
−𝑥. 
In equation 12, 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 are constants, which are determined by the boundary conditions 
specific to the contract that we want to price, which in this case is the value of all future payout 
flow until 𝑉𝐵 is reached. The solution of x is positive, while the one for y is negative. This leads 
to an increase in the first term when V increases. For determining 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 notice that for 
𝑉 ≫ 𝑉𝐵, the claim approaches the total firm value 𝑉. This implies that 𝐴1 = 0. For the case of 
𝑉 = 𝑉𝐵, the value of the claim vanishes, as there is no value for the claimant left. This constraint 
determines that value of 𝐴2. Thus,  
Equation 13 









Following a similar rationale, the value of all future non-interest payments 𝑉𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡 can be 





− [1 − 𝑝𝐵(𝑉)]. 
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The equity value can be computed as the difference between these two claims:  
Equation 16 
𝐸(𝑉) = (1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑓𝑓)(𝑉𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣 − 𝑉𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡), 
where 𝜏𝑒𝑓𝑓 is the effective tax rate.  
Until now it was assumed that 𝑉𝐵 was some parameter in the model. In GJL (2001), however, 
the default level is chosen by the shareholder which acts strategically. It is the point at which 
defaulting is the preferred action over caring on the firm. Once the firm value passed this barrier, 
the remaining firm value is divided between debt, government and bankruptcy cost. Following 
GJL (2001), they state that there is an optimal default level 𝑉𝐵 at which the equity value will be 
maximized while limited liability is given. They obtain the optimal default level 𝑉𝐵 by invoking 


















are used to solve this function.  
For the final step of the dissertation it is necessary to define the expected return of the asset, 𝜇𝑣.  
Following, this function follows  
Equation 20 
𝜇𝑣 = 𝑟 + 𝜃 ∗ 𝜎𝑣, 
where 
𝜎𝑣 is the standard deviation of the asset, while r and 𝜃 are already defined above.  
The functions stated above can be used as auxiliary functions to finally reach the goal of the 
prediction of the probabilities of default. The probabilities of default are computed based on the 
assets volatility and the expected growth rate of the project value.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Can be understood as a boundary condition, that is used for American options. The options' value is maximized 
by following an exercise strategy, which makes option value and deltas continuous (Wilmott, 2006). 
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The formula used follows the form  
Equation 21 






























and needs to be subtracted by 1 in the end to find the real default probabilities. 
 
3.2 Adapting GJL model to the banking sector  
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) are defining their coupon payments to be constant interest 
payments, which is an unrealistic approach towards analysing banks debt. Nevertheless, the 
assumption of fixed costs is mandatory to analyse the companies and their contractual 
obligations to stay solvent. Due to this, the approach of Eisdorfer, Goyal, and Zhdanov (2019) 
is adapted to this dissertation. Following the constant interest payments are substituted by non-
interest expenses. These allow monitoring the operational costs of the bank. 






[1 − 𝑝𝐵(𝑉)], 
where previously C is substituted by the non-interest expenses. 
The implication of operational fixed costs into the GJL (2001)-model it is additionally 
necessary to rewrite equation 18, which is the default barrier,  
Equation 23 




Through the implication of operational fixed costs, the nominator of the optimal default barrier 
is increasing, which is increasing the level of the barrier. Consequently, the operational costs 
increase the coupon payments and followingly the financial obligations that the company has 
to fulfil increase. This will have an increasing effect on the probabilities of default.   
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4. Data Inputs and Model Calibration 
Table 1 – Banks selected 
Company Name Ticker 
Citigroup Inc. C 
BB&T Corporation BBT 
Bank of America BAC 
PNC Financial Services Group. Inc. PNC 
Capital One Financial Corporation COF 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPM 
U.S. Bancorp USB 
Wells Fargo & Company WFC 
 
4.1 Calibration of the GJL (2001) -model  
This section describes the implementation of the iterative approach, that was proposed by 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) for the Merton (1974) model, which can be used for the proposed 
GJL (2001)-model approach presented in Section 3.1. This iterative approach is used to 
compute the volatility of the asset and the payout ratio for each company, which are further 
going to be used for the default probability prediction. Further, these variables can be used to 
find the asset value of the company from historical equity prices. 
 
4.1.1 Iterative Approach – Asset Value and Assert Return volatility 
 
The iterative approach proposed by Vassalou and Xing (2004) follows five steps:  
 
1. Defining a tolerance level of convergence for the volatility variable. 
2. Defining an initial guess to start with. The historical equity return volatility was used to 
work as an initial guess for the equity return volatility in this case. 
3. Create a time series of asset values by using the model value of equity and the observed 
equity. 
4. Computing the standard deviation of the asset returns of these newly retrieved asset 
returns, which are further used. 
5. Computing this process in a repeating manner with the newly computed volatility to 
converge towards the tolerance level. As the value of two consecutive iterations is below 
the tolerance level the iteration stops.  
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This part of the iterative approach provides us with the 𝜎𝑣, which can be used further to predict 
the asset value of the desired company.  
The iterative approach also got used to predict 𝑘. In the model 𝑘 is defined as the project values 
payout ratio, which links the state variable (𝛿) to the asset value of the company.  
Therefore, the iterative approach used in this dissertation to determine 𝜎𝑣 and 𝑘 worked through 
the following steps: 
1. Defining the same tolerance level of convergence as for the volatility variable. 
2. Defining an initial guess of 20% for 𝑘. 
3. Applying the iterative approach to the model equations in section 3.1 EBIT-based 
Model. 
4. Computing 𝑘 through the previously defined ratio of the mean of EBT over the mean of 
the asset value vector.  
5. Computing this process in a repeating manner until two consecutive estimates of 𝑘 are 
falling under the previously set level of convergence.  
This process provides the variables 𝜎𝑣 and 𝑘 that are needed to further recover the asset value 
of companies in the data sample.  
 
4.1.2 Computation of the market price of risk 
 
The market risk premium used in this dissertation is a mandatory variable to compute the 
probabilities of default under the physical measure P.  
The market risk premium got computed by rewriting the expected return formula under the 
CAPM model.  
The CAPM model proposes that the expected return of on equity follows 
Equation 24 
𝜇𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓), 
where 𝜇𝑒 is the expected return on equity,  𝑟𝑓 the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑖 the beta coefficient, and 
(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) the equity risk premium.  
Following this, the expected return on equity can be rewritten as  
Equation 25 
𝜇𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑅𝑃, 
where EQRP is defined as the equity risk premium proposed by Damodaran. 




𝜇𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 (𝜃) ∗ 𝜎𝑒. 
Followingly, the formula for the market price of risk (𝜃) emerges from setting the equations 25 
and 26 equal and solving for the 
Equation 27 




for each bank.  
 
4.2 Data Inputs 
The application of this model to predict the probabilities of defaults requires the usage of a 
combination of accounting data and market data. Therefore, the data used was downloaded 
from multiple websites:  
Table 2 – Inputs and their sources 
Inputs Source 
Net Income before taxes Compustat - Capital IQ 
Market Value Thomson Reuters 
Non-interest expense Compustat - Capital IQ 
Beta coefficient Thomson Reuters 
Equity risk premium (EQRP) Professionals Website 
Interest rate (U.S. Treasury – 30-year bond) Thomson Reuters 
 
4.2.1 Immediate Variables 
 
This section is providing information about the variables that got immediately obtained through 
accounting or market data. The accounting variables used in this dissertation are, notably, the 
net income before taxes, the non-interest expense. The market variables are the beta coefficient, 
the market value, the equity risk premium, the interest rate and the tax rates. 
These variables are used in the iterative approach stated in Chapter 4.1.1 to find the estimated 
volatility, the asset value, the payout ratio 𝑘, and to define the fixed costs.  
 
State variable (𝛿) 
 
The state variable, 𝛿, in this dissertation is defined as the sum of the earnings before taxes and 
the banks' operational fixed costs. The earnings before taxes used in this dissertation are proxied 
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by the net income before taxes. As further mentioned, the banks’ operational fixed costs are 
proxied by using the non-interest expenses of the banks. The GJL (2001)-model implies an 
assumption that the dynamics of the state variable follow a geometric Brownian motion. This 
assumption implies that their log changes follow a normal distribution. To test this, we are 
applying a Shapiro-Wilk test in the program R. The significance level we are testing for is 
chosen for an alpha level of 0.05 and therefore a p-value of less than 0.05 signals a rejection of 
the null hypothesis, which is that the data is normally distributed. For a p-value higher than 0.05 
we don’t reject the null hypothesis, which does not mean that the data is not normally distributed 
(we just can’t reject that hypothesis).  
Table 3 – Shapiro-Wilk Test for Normality 
Shapiro Wilk Test p-value 
Citigroup 0.0292 
BB&T Corporation 0.0075 
Bank of America 0.0614 
PNC Financial Services Group. Inc. 0.1466 
Capital One Financial Corporation 0.0000 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 0.3367 
U.S. Bancorp 0.2069 
Wells Fargo & Company 0.0000 
 
The null hypothesis can be accepted for the Bank of America, Capital One, JPMorgan Chase, 
U.S. Bancorp that the dynamics of their state variables follow a normal distribution. 
Followingly, we reject the test for normal distribution in the cases of Citigroup, BB&T, PNC 
and Wells Fargo & Co and conclude therefore that their state variables are not normally 
distributed. 
Also, the skewness of the companies' state variables was analysed. A negative skewness 
normally refers to a longer or “fatter” tail on the left side of the distribution, while a positive 
skewness refers to a longer or fatter tail on the right side. Financial institutions prefer a negative 
skewness, due to the small amount of very high outliers and the majority of smaller values. 
Therefore, the skewness retrieves information about the extreme values in comparison to one 
and the other tail. The skewness of the companies’ state variable is presented in the following 
table: 
Table 4 – Skewness of companies’ state variable 
C BBT BAC COF PNC JPM USB WFC 
-0.87 -0.01 -0.40 0.19 -0.02 -0.37 -0.50 -0.11 
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It is to see that the state variables of Citigroup, U.S. Bancorp and JPMorgan Chase have the 
largest negative skewness and therefore they are most likely to suffer from the largest decreases 
in values. Nevertheless, negative skewness is preferred due to the likelihood of frequent gains 
and only a few large losses. 
Further, the kurtosis of the state variables was analysed as well to retrieve further information 
about the distribution of the latter. The information that can be observed are the extreme values 
in either tail. Means that a low kurtosis displays fewer extreme values, while a high kurtosis 
displays higher extreme values. The results are presented in the following table:  
Table 5 – Kurtosis of the companies’ state variable 
C BBT BAC COF PNC JPM USB WFC 
5.20 1.94 2.05 1.60 1.21 1.50 2.18 1.22 
 
Following these results, it is to say, that Citigroup, Bank of America, and BB&T are going to 
suffer the most extreme values in their state variables. 
 
Equity value 
In this dissertation, we assume to know the equity value from retrieving the market value of the 
companies in the sample. The data got retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Data stream 
platform.  
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Figure 2 – Quarterly Equity Values (in millions $) 
 
The market value is defined as the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares 
issued. Therefore, it is to see that all financial institutions perceived major declines within their 
equity values throughout the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008. The largest losses in their market 
capitalization were observed for Citigroup, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase. Even 
though, these declines are a signal that shareholders “flee” to quality investments and can 
indicate future solvency risk (Gray and Jobst, 2010).  
 
Equity Risk Premium (EQRP) 
 
The equity risk premium mentioned previously got retrieved from the website of Professor 
Damodaran. He started collecting, cleaning and publishing individual company data on his 
website since the late 1990s to make it available for public use. One of the estimates that is 
going to be applied in this dissertation is the Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) method. This 
valuation method is following two slightly different approaches. Their difference can be found 
within the sustainability of the payout, which can affect the growth rate and their overall levels 
over time. Due to a lack of data for the year 2000 data is retrieved for this case in a different 
way. For these missing years, the equity risk premium is assumed to be the implied premium 
derived from FCFE, for the rest the implied premium from FCFE with sustainable payout is 
taken into consideration. Applying this data resolved that the implied premium from FCFE 
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Figure 3 – Historical Free Cashflow to Equity comparison 
 
 
Historical Betas (𝛽) 
 
To compute the market price of risk, it is necessary to retrieve the historical betas of the 
companies of the sample. These beta coefficients are a measure of systemic risk. Therefore, 
they enable us to look at time periods of increased volatility and exposure to the market. The 
quarterly beta coefficients of the companies are presented in the following figure: 
Figure 4 – Historical Beta Coefficients 𝛽 
 
Substantially it is to say that the historical beta coefficients vary in their value, but they are 
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to decrease while the crisis took place. After the crisis, they were increasing again to a pre-crisis 
level.  
Analysing this behaviour, the betas that were taken into consideration here are computed on the 
basis of a long duration of time, which enables them to return more robust solutions. Further, 
the fact of the long duration could cause a variation in the results, that is not wanted and 
therefore we are assuming a constant, average beta for every bank. The constant value gets 
justified under the assumption that the banks did not change their business model drastically 
through the time period analysed.  
Table 6 – Mean beta coefficient 𝛽 
C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC 




As in the paper published by Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), we assume a constant tax rate 
equal to 20% over the whole time. Hence, we assume a 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 of 20% and 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 of 20%. This assumption was considered throughout the whole paper and 
led to the computation of an effective tax rate of  
(1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) = (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑) ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒), 
which leads up to an effective tax rate of 36% for interest payments to investors. 
Interest rate (RF) 
 
The interest rate used in this dissertation is the 30-year U.S. treasury bond bid rate. This rate is 
decreasing over time. As we want to measure the effect of taxes on the whole company process 
it is necessary to reduce the interest rate by the effective tax rate, which enables us to retrieve 
following interest rate over the time span.  
 31 




Historical equity volatility 𝜎𝑒 
 
The volatility of the equity, 𝜎𝑒, got empirically computed with the program R. Therefore, the 
standard deviation of the difference of the log changes of the equity was taken into 
consideration. Further, the sample size got cleaned from outliers by setting upper and lower 
limits of three standard deviations as boundary conditions. To annualize the results, due to the 
usage of weekly data, got annualized by multiplying them by the square root of 52. 
Table 7 – Annualized equity volatility σ_e 
C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC 
35.27% 25.92% 34.58% 26.78% 38.35% 31.23% 26.20% 25.83% 
 
This table provides information about the financial institutions with the highest and lowest 
volatile equities. COF and C show high volatility of more than 35%, while WFC and BBT 
possess the lowest volatility of around 26%. Regarding the regular definition of volatility, the 
companies with the highest volatilities are meant to be the ones with the highest risk related to 
the size of changes in their assets. 
 
Expected rate of return for equity 𝜇𝑒 
 
Further, the CAPM parameters were used to compute the expected rate of return of the equity 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
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of market price risk. Further, the expected rate of return for equity is used as an auxiliary 
function to compute the market price of risk. 
Table 8 – Average expected rate of return on equity  𝜇𝑒 
C BBT BAC COF PNC JPM USB WFC 
11.98% 8.50% 11.03% 11.05% 8.32% 10.43% 8.52% 8.04% 
 
The CAPM parameters of interest rate and the equity risk premium proposed by Damodaran 
are the same for each bank, due to the same geographic location and at the same time. Therefore, 
the only difference in this computation is the beta coefficient. Due to these similarities in the 
inputs the pure effect of risk that an investment is adding to the portfolio can be observed in the 
different average expected returns.  
 
Market price of risk 𝜃 
 
Further, we analysed the market price of risk by using equation 27. First of all, we computed 
the mean market price of risk.  
Table 9 – Mean market price of risk 𝜃 
C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC 
24.14% 19.47% 21.87% 18.14% 19.79% 22.32% 19.29% 17.71% 
 
The result of the market price of risk retrieved from the companies’ data was taken into 
consideration by computing the mean of it. That was done because the dataset only contains 
companies from the same sector, which includes similarity in the behaviour of the market price 
of risk in times of crisis. Therefore, it can also be seen as a risk-to-reward ratio for a market 
portfolio. The companies with the highest mean market price of risk are Citigroup, Bank of 
America, JPMorgan Chase, and BB&T.  
Further, the market price of risk got analysed by displaying the results in a boxplot graph form. 
This provided further evidence about outliers, minimal and maximal values, and the mean of 
the market price of risk. These results can be observed in the Figures 6.  
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Figure 6 – Market price of risk boxplot 
 
 
As shown in Table 9, the means of the market price of risk differ a lot over the sample. Overall, 
we can conclude that the banks market price of risk tends to be affected a lot by the time series 
of beta. The difference in the shapes of the boxplots can be explained by differences in the 
historical equity volatility as well. The significant differences between the equity volatilities 
cause the variation in the shape of the boxplots. Further, we are analysing the time series results 
of the market risk premium and observe it for in- and decreases.  
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Figure 8 – Panel B (Market price of risk)  
 
Figure 7 and 8 provide information about the dynamics of the market price of risk for the 
corresponding banks.  It can be observed that the market price of risk for all banks are sinking 
in times of crisis and after these occur, they tend to increase again. These changes are mainly 
caused by the time series changes of the equity risk premium as they move similarly. As stated 
above, the previous variation through the time series of the betas was cleaned by using an 
average beta.  
 
4.2.2 Iteratively obtained variables 
 
This section is determined to the variables that got obtained from the iterative approach 
mentioned in chapter 4.1.1. These variables are the annualized volatility of the project 𝜎𝑣 and 
the payout ratio k. 
 
Annualized volatility of the project 𝜎𝑣 
 
Table 10 – Projects volatility σ_v 
C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC 
20.50% 17.97% 22.20% 17.49% 21.43% 20.91% 22.61% 18.04% 
 
In comparison to the historical equity volatility, 𝜎𝑒, it is to say that the projects volatility,  𝜎𝑣, 
is significantly lower in all cases, which can be explained through the naturally higher volatility 
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from significant decreases the higher rates can be explained through this. Another reason could 
be that the project volatility got modelled by implying the operational leverage.  
Further there was a positive correlation between the volatility of the equity and the asset 
volatility observed.  
 
 
Payout ratio k 
Table 11 – Payout ratio for each company 
C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC 
3.00% 2.68% 3.15% 2.74% 3.32% 3.12% 2.44% 2.79% 
 
The payout ratios k found within the financial sector of the United States contains similar values 
over the whole data sample. Even though there have been banks that have been hit by the 
financial crisis their payout ratios overall are similar to the ones that were hit less. In GJL 
(2001)’s paper, they state that there is a positive correlation between the level of C and the value 
for the payout ratio k, which tends to be not the case. Typically, a lower level of k can be found 
in companies that are reinvesting their earnings into growing business, research, or further 
developments. Overall, a positive and stable payout ratio is important for companies to indicate 
shareholders that the company is knowing about their risk and reducing it. Further, the reduction 
of default risk, through good risk management can lead to higher future payout ratios, which 
are then priced by the market by stock acquisitions, which was found by Charitou and 
Lambertides (2011).  
















This chapter has two sections. The first section discusses the values obtained for the distance-
to-default and the probability of default and explores the roots behind these results. The second 
section compares the obtained results with the ones implied by the credit ratings given by two 
of the most important rating agencies: Moody’s and S&P.  
 
5.1 Credit Risk Indicators  
This section presents the credit risk metrics that were computed in this dissertation. These 
metrics were the default barrier-to-asset ratio, the drift of the process, the distance-to-default 
(DD) and the probabilities of default. 
 
5.1.1 Default barrier-to-asset ratio  
 
The barrier-to-asset ratio tells how far the bank is from default at a given moment in time. As 
such, it can be interpreted as a measure of leverage. The barrier-to-asset ratio is always lower 
than 1. The closer this ratio is to 1 the closer the company is to default. Differently from the 
distance-to-default, the barrier-to-asset ratio does not adjust for risk. Figure 9 and 10 show the 
barrier-to-asset ratio for the eight banks considered in this dissertation. The ratios range from 
14.55% to 71.38%. For most of the banks the maximum value was obtained between Q1 and 
Q3 of 2009, while three banks obtained values above 50%. These three were Citigroup 
(71.38%), the Bank of America (51.37%), and Capital One (51.01%). The yearly results are 
presented in Appendix 5. 
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Figure 9 – Default barrier-to-asset ratio 
 
Figure 10 – Default barrier-to-asset ratio 
 
 
5.1.2 Drift of the process 𝜇𝑝 
 
The drift of the process tells us the expected growth rate of the project value. It is defined as 
the difference between the expected return from the project 𝜇𝑣 and the payout ratio 𝑘. Figure 
11 and 12 show the drift of the process. The drift ranges from 1.82% to 7.83%, while the average 
drift is 4.72%. The most banks obtained their maximum value in Q2 2011. Meanwhile the 
minimum value for the most banks were obtained in Q3 2016.  As the market price of risk, the 
payout ratio and the project volatility are constant variables in this computation, its dynamics 
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implies that the banks are expected to deleverage over time. The yearly drifts of the process are 
presented in Appendix 7. 
Figure 11 – Drift of the process 𝜇𝑝 
 
Figure 12 – Drift of the process 𝜇𝑝 
 
 
5.1.3 Distance-to-Default (5-year) 
Figures 13 and 14 present the distance-to-default for the 8 banks considered. On average the 
distance-to-default is 3.16. The bank with the lowest average value is Citigroup (0.98) and the 
one with the highest average value is BB&T (2.62). The yearly distance-to-default values for 
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Figure 13 – Quarterly DD of companies 
 
Figure 14 – Quarterly DD of companies 
 
The smallest distance-to-default was found for Citigroup, in March 2009 with a value of 0.98. 
Further, the Bank of America was analysed to have the second-lowest value with 1.53 on the 
same date. The third lowest value of 1.54 for the data sample got retrieved for Capital One 
Financial Corp. on the 13th of March 2009. The distance-to-default for all banks are highly 
correlated with an average correlation value of 85.69%. This high level of correlation results 
from the high correlation observed in stock prices. Further, this could result from “similar” asset 
volatilities retrieved from the iterative approach. Through their similar values in a range from 
17.49% to 22.61%, the difference in the distance-to-default’s most likely occurs through 
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information about the distance-of-the assets from the barrier, which monitors leverage. Further, 
information regarding the risk through the volatility of the assets, and the expected change in 
leverage through the drift.   
 
5.1.4 Probabilities of default (5-years) 
 
The probabilities of default that got retrieved from applying the model on the banking sector 
are the core element of this dissertation. Further, the probabilities were computed as 5-year 
probabilities of default. All calculations were done on weekly frequency. This was important 
to better estimating the model parameters. For simplicity, we decided however to present 
quarterly graphs, while mentioning peaks in a weekly frame. In addition, yearly results are 
presented in Appendix 4. Figure 15 and Figure 16 present the probabilities of default in a 
quarterly timeframe.  
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Figure 16 – Quarterly probabilities of default 
 
 
Figure 15 and 16 enable us to observe the general movements of the probabilities of default, 
even though extreme outliers are not observable. These extreme outliers are still observed 
throughout the calculations and consequently mentioned in the text. Before analysing the 
different impacts of the crisis, it is to say that most of the time the probabilities of default for 
the banks were close to zero. The average probability of default ranges from 0.06% in 2006 to 
5.80% in 2009.  
At the beginning of Figure 15 and 16, around Q3 2000 and Q1 2001, there was an increase of 
the probabilities of default for the Capital One Finance and JPMorgan Chase. In the beginning, 
JPMorgan’s default probability increased to around 1.2%. Capital One Finance’s rate increased 
in Q3 2001 to around 2%. This increase can be explained through the burst of the so-called 
"dotcom" bubble. This bubble was created by speculative investors that overvalued tech 
companies, which was leading to strongly increasing equity markets in the previous years. As 
the bubble was at its peak, big tech companies placed sell orders on their stocks, which caused 
the bubble to explode. Therefore, the effect on especially these three banks could be caused 
through their financial involvement in holding their stocks or credits towards these companies.   
Further, it is to observe, that the default probability of Capital One Finance increased over the 
time frame of 2002 to 2003 and peaked at a value of 4.74%. This could have been caused by 
Capital One’s acquisition of PeopleFirst Finance LLC in late 2001. Additionally, economists 
claimed that the United States suffered under a recession throughout the years of 2000 to 2002, 
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that peaked at 1.74% again. The reasons for this increase could be dedicated to the recession or 
some late effects of J.P. Morgan & Co’s merger with Chase Manhattan Bank.  
Of special interest are the developments during the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008. First of all, 
it is to say that the default probabilities of all retail banks increased significantly in comparison 
to the previous months. The whole sector peaked with a value of 5.80% in 2009.  
Although the whole sector suffered from significant increases some companies suffered 
especially from the crisis. The largest increase in their default probabilities was measured for 
Citigroup with a peak of 38.72% in Q1 of 2009. At the same time, the default probability of the 
Bank of America increased to 15.97% and Capital One Finance’s peaked at 15.10%. These 
companies suffered the most from the financial crisis and therefore their probabilities of default 
were on the highest levels. In the case of Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and the Bank of America 
we can try to explain that on a macro-economic level that these companies were actively 
participating in the secondary and securitized mortgage market that was leading towards the 
financial crisis. While these securitized mortgages were traded the balance sheets of the banks 
gained strength and they were enabled to trade even more of these, which could explain the 
difference in the capital losses. As this bubble collapsed it materialized into losses that 
destroyed the capital of the banks and the global economy. 
Additionally, it is to observe that after the financial crisis the probabilities of default nearly 
decreased to the pre-crisis level, but then increased again. The probabilities of default for the 
Bank of America raised to 10.01%, Capital Finance One and JPM increased to around 2.11%, 
while Citigroup increased to 2.89%. This increase was caused by a combination of the 
downgrading of the American credit rating from AAA to AA+ by Standard & Poor’s on the 6th 
of August 2011, the European sovereign debt crisis in Spain and Italy, and international 
discussions about France’s credit rating. These left the stock markets very volatile and caused 
the S&P 500 to decline by 6.2% on the 8th of August 2011, as an immediate reaction of the 
market4.  
Finally, there was an increase in the default probability to around 2.3% at the end of 2016 and 
the beginning of 2017 observable for Capital One Finance. This increase can be explained 
through a slumping oil price, the Brexit vote and the acquisition of Paribus by the company in 
October 20165. 
                                                 
4 Information retrieved from: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120323002407/http://heraldnews.suntimes.com/business/6946196-420/dow-
dropped-634-monday-in-worst-one-day-drop-since-december-2008.html 
5 Information retrieved from: https://www.americanbanker.com/news/capital-one-adds-to-its-growing-list-of-
fintech-deals 
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5.2 Comparison to Rating Agencies  
5.2.1 Implied probability of default from rating agencies 
 
Finally, it is important to analyse the reasonability of the results. Accordingly, the credit ratings 
given by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s were obtained and converted into probabilities of 
default using an historical transition matrix. The yearly results for the rating agencies are shown 
in Appendix 8 and 9. The lack of accessible data only enabled us to download the historical 
credit ratings for the time period of 2006 to 2018. These ratings were downloaded from the 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database and the corresponding annual reports. Figure 17 presents a 
time series for the probability of default using the proposed model and the referred historical 
transition matrix in conjunction with credit ratings. The probabilities of default used were 
average annual probabilities of default. The credit ratings were chosen according to the latest 
credit rating that was published in one year. On average the model leads to a probability of 
default only slightly above the one implied by credit ratings. The average default probability of 
1.31% returned from the model for the corresponding time period, the implied default 
probability was on average 1.07%, in the case of Standard & Poor’s, and 0.82%, in the case of 
Moody’s. Looking by year, my results suggest that the model is overestimating the probabilities 
of default in times of crisis (2008-2009 and 2011-2013) and underestimating them in periods 
of economic growth (2006-2007 and 2014-2018).  
Figure 17 – Credit Rating implied probabilities of default and model comparison 
  
Figure 18 presents a scatter plot of the probabilities of default implied by the model and by 
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by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s is presented. Figure 18 also presents the output from 
fitting a linear regression model to the data points.  
Figure 18 – Scatter plot of model and implied rating probabilities of default
 
Figure 18 leads us to the conclusion that our model and the implied probabilities from the rating 
agencies share a slightly positive relation. The measured correlation between the results is 
18.63%. Further, the results were tested using a “linear model” function in R, which retrieved 
a p-value of 0.0634. Thus, the coefficient is not significant at the usual 5% significance level, 
but it is significant at the less conservative 10% significance level. 
 
5.2.2 Comparison to the inverse normal cumulative DD’s 
 
As the comparison between the probabilities of default implied by the credit ratings and the 
model probabilities of default returned only a weak positive correlation, we decided to test the 
relation between the symmetric of the inverse normal function of the probabilities of default. 
This measure is often called the distance-to-default. The excel formula “Norm.Inv” was used 
on the model PD’s and the implied PD’s from the credit ratings. This was done because the 
distance-to-default is generally more stable, meaning that this measure does decrease as much 
as the probability of default increases in times of crisis neither increases as much as the 
probability of default decreases in good times. Figure 19 presents a time series for the distance-
























to-default implied by the model and by the credit ratings. The average implied distance-to-
default ranges from 1.83 in 2009 to 3.52 in 2006. Overall, it is to say that the average value 
obtained is 2.72. Meanwhile the average value obtained from the implied ratings of Moody’s 
was 2.55 and 2.53 for Standard & Poor’s. Even though it is to state that the rating implied DD’s 
don’t go as low as the ones from the model in 2009. Before this and after 2014 the ones of the 
model seem to underestimate in comparison to the rating agencies.  
Figure 19 – Correlation between model and agencies implied results 
 
Figure 20 is similar to Figure 18, but this time the distance-to-default is presented. The results 
from the application on the model PD’s are presented in Appendix 10. This time there is a 
positive correlation of 52.32% and a test of the results using the “linear model” function in R 
returns that the results are highly significant (p-value: 0.0001, significant for all the usual 
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Figure 20 – Correlation of rating agencies and model DD's 
 
 
But why do I obtain a significant relation between the distance-to-default and not the 
probabilities of default? We are trying to explain this fact by using figure 21 that was taken 
from the paper of Ferry, Hughes, and Ding (2012). It presents the relation between the distance-
to-default computing from Merton’s model and the probability of default evaluating that 
distance-to-default on the Normal distribution and an empirical distribution. It is clear that using 
the Normal distribution leads to an underestimation of the probability of default for high values 
of the distance-to-default and an overestimation for low values. The first is often attributed to 
the risk of sudden jumps which are not accounted in Merton’s model. The second may result 
from many things. One possibility is the lack of mean reversion. In the case of banks there is 
another reason however that may justify this, which is the presence of government implicit 
guarantees.  There is a vast literature stating that structural models using equity calibrated data 
tend to ignore these implicit guarantees (Gray and Jobst, 2010). These guarantees benefit the 
bank’s debt holders, while they leave the equity values nearly unchanged. Structural models 
using the CDS spreads are better able to capture the expected losses suffered by banks 
debtholders because they take into account the government guarantees.  

























The goal of this dissertation was the implementation of a structural credit risk model to the eight 
largest retail banks in the United States. The model chosen for this purpose was inspired by the 
papers of Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) and Eisdorfer, Goyal and Zhdanov (2019). As 
mentioned, these models were adapted to the case of a retail bank and further calibrated.  
The model was applied for the period between 2000 and 2018. The chosen time period covers 
the effects of the dotcom bubble crisis, the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, and the European 
sovereign debt crisis on the probabilities of default. The default probabilities varied over the 
time from 0.06% on average in 2006 to 5.80% on average in 2009. The probabilities of default 
peaked in the year 2009 with a value of 5.80% for the whole sector.  
The results obtained were compared with the ones implied by the credit ratings given by 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Based on this comparison, one can conclude that, on average, 
the model overestimates slightly banks’ probabilities of default. Interestingly, it was found that 
the model tends to significantly overestimate the probability of default in crisis times and 
underestimate it in normal times. The time series dynamics were also compared. The implied 
probabilities of default were found to have a small positive correlation with the probabilities of 
default that arise from the application of the model. This correlation is not significant at the 5% 
significance level, though. Next, correlations were computed using the distance-to-distress 
instead of the probability of default. In this case, a stronger and clearly significant positive 
correlation was found. Finally, this dissertation discusses why the relation between the distance-
to-default is found be stronger than the relation between the probabilities of default. In addition 
to non-Normal returns, it is argued that structural models calibrated based on equity data tend 
to overestimate banks probabilities of default in crisis times because they do not take into 
account government implicit guarantees. These were shown to be very relevant throughout the 
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Appendix 1 – Non-interest expense (in $ million) 
Date C BBT BAC COF PNC JPM USB WFC 
2000 
   
11,850.00  
        
481.81  
     
4,482.00  
        
757.05  
        
773.00  
     
5,217.00  
     
1,340.17  
     
2,890.67  
2001 
   
11,767.35  
        
480.37  
     
4,679.50  
        
951.51  
        
787.50  
     
5,456.50  
     
1,375.68  
     
3,168.50  
2002 
     
9,878.75  
        
539.58  
     
4,731.75  
     
1,134.78  
        
857.00  
     
4,832.00  
     
1,414.93  
     
3,546.00  
2003 
   
10,884.50  
        
735.62  
     
4,892.75  
     
1,144.57  
        
857.50  
     
5,377.75  
     
1,409.74  
     
4,167.75  
2004 
   
10,584.25  
        
603.51  
     
6,155.25  
     
1,239.17  
        
911.00  
     
6,386.00  
     
1,371.33  
     
4,275.50  
2005 
   
11,564.00  
        
765.75  
     
6,924.75  
     
1,421.03  
     
1,037.00  
     
8,898.50  
     
1,438.50  
     
4,768.50  
2006 
   
12,638.00  
        
845.42  
     
8,301.00  
     
1,665.87  
     
1,141.00  
     
9,492.67  
     
1,518.50  
     
5,021.25  
2007 
   
14,291.00  
        
904.25  
     
8,923.50  
     
1,873.18  
     
1,013.00  
   
10,124.92  
     
1,623.25  
     
5,587.00  
2008 
   
15,343.25  
        
956.75  
   
10,055.50  
     
1,838.71  
     
1,120.50  
   
10,673.00  
     
1,790.75  
     
5,622.00  
2009 
   
15,085.25  
     
1,095.25  
   
14,695.25  
     
1,815.38  
     
1,988.42  
   
12,576.50  
     
1,967.00  
   
10,507.75  
2010 
   
12,060.50  
     
1,362.25  
   
16,261.50  
     
1,918.25  
     
2,140.25  
   
12,939.00  
     
2,281.50  
   
12,484.25  
2011 
   
12,795.50  
     
1,400.25  
   
17,726.50  
     
2,161.25  
     
2,181.50  
   
14,478.50  
     
2,328.50  
   
12,527.50  
2012 
   
12,575.50  
     
1,471.25  
   
16,843.25  
     
2,688.75  
     
2,561.75  
   
14,702.25  
     
2,581.00  
   
12,498.25  
2013 
   
12,712.25  
     
1,455.50  
   
16,399.00  
     
3,020.50  
     
2,541.00  
   
14,865.50  
     
2,335.25  
   
12,415.00  
2014 
   
13,396.25  
     
1,438.50  
   
14,982.00  
     
2,969.25  
     
2,380.00  
   
14,721.50  
     
2,512.00  
   
12,118.75  
2015 
   
11,896.50  
     
1,418.25  
   
14,380.00  
     
3,126.25  
     
2,401.50  
   
14,180.25  
     
2,616.75  
   
12,512.50  
2016 
   
10,714.00  
     
1,610.75  
   
13,485.50  
     
3,251.00  
     
2,357.75  
   
14,025.75  
     
2,758.75  
   
12,959.00  
2017 
   
10,494.00  
     
1,689.75  
   
13,539.00  
     
3,443.50  
     
2,444.50  
   
14,512.75  
     
2,869.75  
   
13,735.75  
2018 
   
10,619.00  
     
1,727.75  
   
13,287.25  
     
3,546.50  
     
2,695.00  
   
15,660.00  
     
3,176.00  
   
14,003.75  
 
Appendix 2 – Earnings before taxes (in millions $) 
Date C BBT BAC COF PNC JPM USB WFC 
2000 
     
5,493.25  
        
289.05  
     
3,084.50  
        
202.85  
        
468.75  
     
2,541.00  
     
1,170.38  
     
1,637.75  
2001 
     
5,449.20  
        
389.85  
     
2,855.50  
        
258.86  
        
166.25  
     
1,291.75  
     
1,003.50  
     
1,369.75  
2002 
     
4,998.75  
        
457.49  
     
3,279.75  
        
383.52  
        
474.67  
     
1,453.25  
     
1,382.37  
     
2,213.50  
2003 
     
6,642.25  
        
522.93  
     
3,965.25  
        
456.70  
        
400.00  
     
2,547.00  
     
1,427.78  
     
2,410.00  
2004 
     
7,491.50  
        
581.97  
     
5,474.00  
        
590.02  
        
436.25  
     
2,798.00  
     
1,592.75  




     
7,358.25  
        
614.75  
     
6,223.00  
        
708.93  
        
491.00  
     
3,809.33  
     
1,643.00  
     
2,933.00  
2006 
     
7,409.75  
        
622.75  
     
8,194.50  
     
1,027.91  
        
484.75  
     
4,853.00  
     
1,724.00  
     
3,186.25  
2007 
     
5,767.75  
        
647.75  
     
6,746.50  
     
1,032.71  
        
573.50  
     
6,428.50  
     
1,634.25  
     
3,842.25  
2008 
        
471.25  
        
780.50  
     
5,390.75  
        
431.36  
        
572.67  
     
5,151.25  
     
1,024.75  
     
2,784.75  
2009 
-   
1,978.00  
        
800.25  
   
10,195.25  
        
393.25  
     
1,290.33  
     
7,645.75  
        
688.75  
     
4,752.50  
2010 
     
3,297.25  
        
259.50  
     
3,874.25  
     
1,102.50  
     
1,025.25  
     
8,064.75  
     
1,050.00  
     
4,750.25  
2011 
     
3,656.00  
        
411.00  
     
1,998.00  
     
1,181.75  
     
1,056.50  
     
7,912.25  
     
1,580.00  
     
5,914.00  
2012 
     
1,956.25  
        
715.00  
     
1,443.00  
     
1,266.25  
        
984.00  
     
7,985.50  
     
1,931.50  
     
7,108.50  
2013 
     
4,874.25  
        
792.50  
     
5,560.75  
     
1,699.00  
     
1,422.00  
     
9,253.50  
     
1,941.00  
     
8,157.25  
2014 
     
3,675.25  
        
823.75  
     
5,813.75  
     
1,711.00  
     
1,403.50  
     
8,386.00  
     
1,998.75  
     
8,478.75  
2015 
     
6,206.50  
        
834.75  
     
5,817.50  
     
1,549.25  
     
1,376.75  
     
8,289.50  
     
2,007.50  
     
8,410.25  
2016 
     
5,369.25  
        
917.50  
     
6,419.75  
     
1,453.75  
     
1,313.25  
     
8,554.75  
     
2,026.25  
     
8,030.00  
2017 
     
5,773.00  
        
958.25  
     
7,496.75  
     
1,456.50  
     
1,372.50  
     
8,810.25  
     
1,879.25  
     
7,769.25  
2018 
     
5,861.25  
     
1,051.50  
     
8,895.00  
     
1,898.00  
     
1,607.00  
   
10,209.00  
     
2,169.50  
     
7,134.50  
 
Appendix 3 – State variable (in millions $) 
Date C BBT BAC COF PNC JPM USB WFC 
2000 69,849.0 3,014.1 30,421.0 3,905.1 4,978.0 31,557.0 4,681.5 18,438.0 
2001 66,762.2 3,589.7 30,826.0 5,093.4 4,023.0 26,162.0 4,014.0 18,391.0 
2002 60,786.0 4,076.2 31,427.0 6,009.7 4,334.7 25,283.0 5,529.5 23,566.0 
2003 69,678.0 4,661.4 36,016.0 6,683.5 5,076.0 31,844.0 5,711.1 26,830.0 
2004 72,717.0 5,218.2 47,920.0 7,682.3 5,480.0 40,553.0 6,371.0 28,307.0 
2005 75,713.0 5,634.0 53,161.0 8,547.3 6,253.0 41,816.3 6,572.0 30,622.0 
2006 82,877.0 5,989.0 67,570.0 9,092.7 6,382.0 48,523.0 6,896.0 33,500.0 
2007 82,280.0 6,206.0 64,100.0 11,947.6 6,590.0 67,208.0 6,537.0 37,993.0 
2008 70,615.0 6,945.0 62,157.0 8,975.4 5,559.7 63,673.0 4,099.0 33,759.0 
2009 41,525.0 7,912.0 104,773.0 8,785.0 12,025.3 81,618.0 2,755.0 68,030.0 
2010 61,407.0 6,639.0 81,785.0 12,264.0 12,714.0 86,055.0 4,200.0 69,342.0 
2011 66,580.0 7,430.0 78,844.0 13,919.0 13,331.0 89,660.0 6,320.0 73,032.0 
2012 58,670.0 8,620.0 73,565.0 16,387.0 14,518.0 91,658.0 7,726.0 78,839.0 
2013 68,815.0 8,961.0 85,386.0 18,931.0 15,369.0 96,381.0 7,764.0 81,471.0 
2014 70,391.0 8,979.0 81,972.0 18,749.0 15,102.0 91,973.0 7,995.0 82,980.0 
2015 69,246.0 9,183.0 79,804.0 18,877.0 14,970.0 89,202.0 8,030.0 83,690.0 
2016 63,126.0 10,221.0 80,104.0 19,042.0 14,729.0 90,307.0 8,105.0 84,541.0 
2017 65,272.0 10,770.0 83,956.0 19,686.0 15,888.0 94,745.0 7,517.0 85,989.0 
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2018 65,500.0 10,992.0 88,579.0 22,220.0 16,724.0 103,984.0 8,678.0 84,696.0 
 
Appendix 4 – Yearly 5-year probabilities of default (PD) 
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2000 0.06% 0.01% 0.17% 0.02% 0.49% 0.55% 0.37% 0.00% 0.21% 
2001 0.05% 0.00% 0.18% 0.02% 1.09% 0.31% 0.10% 0.01% 0.22% 
2002 0.08% 0.00% 0.07% 0.09% 2.49% 0.81% 0.03% 0.01% 0.45% 
2003 0.10% 0.01% 0.08% 0.14% 2.63% 0.96% 0.03% 0.04% 0.50% 
2004 0.03% 0.00% 0.04% 0.08% 0.56% 0.27% 0.01% 0.01% 0.13% 
2005 0.05% 0.00% 0.03% 0.11% 0.44% 0.32% 0.01% 0.02% 0.12% 
2006 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.24% 0.12% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 
2007 0.18% 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.36% 0.17% 0.01% 0.02% 0.10% 
2008 3.38% 0.06% 0.72% 0.03% 1.66% 0.40% 0.03% 0.08% 0.80% 
2009 22.35% 0.70% 8.79% 1.86% 8.16% 1.85% 0.68% 1.98% 5.80% 
2010 1.30% 0.34% 2.34% 0.27% 1.84% 0.69% 0.26% 0.59% 0.95% 
2011 1.46% 0.35% 5.02% 0.24% 1.27% 0.80% 0.15% 0.42% 1.21% 
2012 2.64% 0.32% 7.24% 0.51% 1.50% 1.43% 0.18% 0.41% 1.78% 
2013 1.26% 0.30% 3.56% 0.44% 1.49% 0.95% 0.12% 0.27% 1.05% 
2014 1.13% 0.11% 1.61% 0.10% 0.67% 0.53% 0.07% 0.06% 0.54% 
2015 0.75% 0.11% 1.56% 0.10% 0.95% 0.42% 0.10% 0.06% 0.51% 
2016 1.06% 0.20% 2.06% 0.16% 2.02% 0.47% 0.19% 0.17% 0.79% 
2017 0.32% 0.06% 0.42% 0.03% 1.42% 0.12% 0.08% 0.11% 0.32% 
2018 0.20% 0.03% 0.10% 0.01% 0.83% 0.05% 0.08% 0.08% 0.17% 
 
Appendix 5 – Barrier-to-asset ratio  
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2000 27.95% 27.47% 26.97% 30.08% 32.30% 34.12% 30.10% 26.15% 29.39% 
2001 26.06% 23.25% 26.17% 28.14% 34.05% 30.58% 22.35% 26.37% 27.12% 
2002 27.22% 22.82% 24.15% 33.43% 39.52% 35.41% 21.37% 27.64% 28.95% 
2003 27.83% 26.10% 24.07% 35.04% 39.45% 35.83% 20.39% 30.11% 29.85% 
2004 25.40% 22.57% 22.45% 33.83% 32.34% 30.81% 17.80% 27.86% 26.63% 
2005 26.86% 24.56% 22.06% 35.19% 31.31% 32.16% 18.22% 28.82% 27.40% 
2006 28.23% 25.44% 21.89% 32.25% 30.72% 30.38% 18.04% 27.96% 26.86% 
2007 30.50% 26.90% 22.70% 28.05% 30.54% 30.27% 18.58% 29.15% 27.09% 
2008 46.41% 32.53% 31.80% 31.12% 38.91% 33.80% 21.55% 32.79% 33.61% 
2009 60.97% 38.13% 46.33% 44.35% 45.84% 37.49% 29.33% 42.58% 43.13% 
2010 39.80% 36.53% 38.94% 36.97% 37.94% 34.74% 27.21% 39.09% 36.40% 
2011 41.75% 38.25% 46.04% 37.17% 37.09% 36.88% 26.78% 38.71% 37.83% 
2012 43.41% 35.54% 47.32% 38.17% 35.50% 37.82% 25.41% 35.96% 37.39% 
2013 36.33% 34.10% 38.84% 35.66% 33.90% 33.63% 22.87% 32.77% 33.51% 
2014 36.61% 31.33% 34.57% 31.82% 30.68% 31.62% 21.74% 29.12% 30.94% 
2015 33.51% 30.46% 33.56% 30.75% 31.53% 29.84% 22.13% 28.34% 30.02% 
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2016 34.82% 31.86% 34.52% 31.72% 35.10% 29.76% 23.67% 30.77% 31.53% 
2017 30.28% 29.05% 27.49% 27.66% 33.96% 25.71% 21.61% 30.29% 28.26% 
2018 30.26% 27.97% 24.15% 27.23% 32.79% 24.40% 22.84% 30.72% 27.55% 
Average 34.43% 29.73% 31.26% 33.09% 34.92% 32.38% 22.74% 31.33% 
 
Volatility 8.99% 5.13% 8.76% 4.32% 4.02% 3.69% 3.64% 4.61% 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Distance-to-default yearly values (DD) 
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2000 3.49 4.06 3.21 3.93 2.88 2.90 2.98 4.17 3.45 
2001 3.51 4.36 3.15 3.94 2.63 3.03 3.54 3.98 3.52 
2002 3.57 4.50 3.46 3.53 2.42 2.82 3.72 3.92 3.49 
2003 3.39 4.00 3.36 3.24 2.31 2.68 3.72 3.54 3.28 
2004 3.66 4.50 3.57 3.41 2.81 3.09 4.06 3.83 3.61 
2005 3.53 4.24 3.61 3.31 2.89 2.99 4.01 3.74 3.54 
2006 3.59 4.32 3.80 3.73 3.09 3.29 4.19 4.00 3.75 
2007 3.30 4.07 3.62 4.05 3.01 3.19 4.04 3.79 3.63 
2008 2.37 3.53 2.95 3.71 2.49 2.99 3.74 3.45 3.15 
2009 1.49 2.84 1.89 2.47 1.91 2.49 2.84 2.49 2.30 
2010 2.55 3.05 2.34 3.07 2.41 2.77 3.10 2.81 2.76 
2011 2.60 3.03 2.13 3.15 2.58 2.78 3.24 2.94 2.81 
2012 2.29 3.00 1.87 2.84 2.48 2.50 3.15 2.90 2.63 
2013 2.55 3.00 2.15 2.94 2.46 2.62 3.26 3.06 2.75 
2014 2.58 3.28 2.43 3.31 2.73 2.81 3.41 3.43 3.00 
2015 2.72 3.28 2.44 3.32 2.61 2.88 3.31 3.42 3.00 
2016 2.59 3.11 2.35 3.18 2.33 2.85 3.13 3.16 2.84 
2017 2.98 3.44 2.89 3.64 2.46 3.25 3.39 3.28 3.17 
2018 3.13 3.68 3.31 3.83 2.67 3.51 3.40 3.38 3.36 
Average 2.94 3.65 2.87 3.40 2.59 2.92 3.49 3.44  
Volatility 58.95% 58.21% 64.28% 41.64% 27.78% 26.86% 39.50% 46.10%  
 
Appendix 7 – Yearly drift of the project 𝜇𝑝 
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2000 5.72% 5.18% 5.52% 4.98% 5.00% 5.46% 5.95% 4.97% 5.35% 
2001 4.77% 4.30% 4.59% 4.05% 4.06% 4.57% 5.05% 4.06% 4.43% 
2002 6.25% 5.23% 6.03% 4.86% 5.27% 5.92% 6.27% 4.87% 5.59% 
2003 5.45% 4.46% 5.26% 4.09% 4.49% 5.15% 5.50% 4.10% 4.81% 
2004 5.84% 4.85% 5.65% 4.48% 4.88% 5.53% 5.88% 4.49% 5.20% 
2005 5.90% 4.90% 5.70% 4.53% 4.94% 5.59% 5.94% 4.55% 5.26% 
2006 7.34% 6.09% 7.13% 5.65% 6.25% 7.01% 7.30% 5.69% 6.56% 
2007 6.37% 5.35% 6.16% 4.98% 5.39% 6.03% 6.38% 4.98% 5.70% 
2008 7.19% 5.65% 6.94% 5.15% 5.94% 6.81% 7.03% 5.21% 6.24% 
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2009 4.75% 3.75% 4.57% 3.38% 3.79% 4.42% 4.77% 3.36% 4.10% 
2010 5.80% 4.54% 5.58% 4.11% 4.70% 5.46% 5.75% 4.15% 5.01% 
2011 7.27% 5.48% 7.02% 4.92% 5.90% 6.86% 7.01% 5.00% 6.18% 
2012 5.39% 3.85% 5.16% 3.35% 4.15% 4.97% 5.19% 3.38% 4.43% 
2013 3.93% 2.93% 3.75% 2.55% 2.97% 3.60% 3.95% 2.54% 3.28% 
2014 4.31% 3.30% 4.10% 2.93% 3.33% 3.99% 4.34% 2.94% 3.65% 
2015 3.79% 2.79% 3.59% 2.42% 2.82% 3.47% 3.83% 2.43% 3.14% 
2016 3.45% 2.45% 3.25% 2.08% 2.49% 3.14% 3.49% 2.10% 2.81% 
2017 3.99% 3.00% 3.79% 2.62% 3.03% 3.68% 4.03% 2.64% 3.35% 
2018 5.27% 4.03% 5.07% 3.60% 4.19% 4.95% 5.23% 3.64% 4.50% 
Average 5.41% 4.32% 5.20% 3.93% 4.40% 5.08% 5.42% 3.95% 4.72% 
 
Appendix 8 – Implied probabilities of default (S&P)6 
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2006 0.32% 0.33% 0.33% 0.45% 2.11% 0.45% 0.36% 0.16% 0.62% 
2007 0.32% 0.45% 0.16% 0.45% 2.11% 0.33% 0.36% 0.16% 0.60% 
2008 0.49% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 1.03% 0.45% 0.36% 0.33% 0.53% 
2009 0.49% 0.49% 0.49% 0.49% 1.42% 0.45% 0.45% 0.33% 0.61% 
2010 0.49% 0.49% 0.49% 0.49% 1.42% 0.45% 0.45% 0.33% 0.61% 
2011 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 0.49% 1.42% 0.49% 0.45% 0.45% 0.65% 
2012 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 1.42% 0.49% 0.49% 0.45% 0.67% 
2013 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 1.42% 0.49% 0.45% 0.45% 0.66% 
2014 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 1.42% 0.49% 0.45% 0.45% 0.66% 
2015 0.57% 0.57% 1.03% 0.57% 1.42% 0.57% 0.45% 0.49% 0.74% 
2016 1.03% 0.57% 1.03% 0.57% 1.42% 0.57% 0.45% 0.49% 0.81% 
2017 1.03% 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 1.42% 0.57% 0.45% 0.49% 0.74% 
2018 1.03% 0.57% 0.57% 0.57% 1.42% 0.57% 0.45% 0.49% 0.74% 
 
Appendix 9 – Implied probabilities of default (Moody's)7 
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2006 3.35 4.12 3.56 3.50 2.82 3.04 4.00 3.79 3.52 
2007 2.91 3.81 3.36 3.78 2.69 2.93 3.80 3.55 3.36 
2008 1.83 3.22 2.45 3.40 2.13 2.65 3.45 3.16 2.79 
2009 0.76 2.46 1.35 2.08 1.39 2.09 2.47 2.06 1.83 
2010 2.23 2.71 1.99 2.78 2.09 2.46 2.80 2.52 2.45 
2011 2.18 2.70 1.64 2.82 2.24 2.41 2.96 2.63 2.45 
2012 1.94 2.73 1.46 2.57 2.17 2.19 2.91 2.65 2.33 
                                                 
6 Data collected from the S&P Global Fixed Income Research 2018 annual global corporate report default study 
and rating transition report 
7 Data collected from the S&P Global Fixed Income Research 2018 annual global corporate report default study 
and rating transition report 
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2013 2.24 2.75 1.80 2.62 2.17 2.34 3.03 2.78 2.47 
2014 2.28 3.06 2.14 3.08 2.47 2.56 3.20 3.22 2.75 
2015 2.43 3.05 2.15 3.10 2.35 2.63 3.09 3.22 2.75 
2016 2.31 2.88 2.04 2.96 2.05 2.60 2.90 2.93 2.58 
2017 2.73 3.22 2.64 3.45 2.19 3.02 3.17 3.06 2.94 
2018 2.88 3.47 3.08 3.62 2.40 3.30 3.17 3.15 3.13 
Average 2.31 3.09 2.28 3.06 2.24 2.63 3.15 2.98 2.72 
 
Appendix 10 - Inverse normal function on model PD's (yearly results) 
Date C BBT BAC PNC COF JPM USB WFC Average 
2006 3.35 4.12 3.56 3.50 2.82 3.04 4.00 3.79 3.52 
2007 2.91 3.81 3.36 3.78 2.69 2.93 3.80 3.55 3.36 
2008 1.83 3.22 2.45 3.40 2.13 2.65 3.45 3.16 2.79 
2009 0.76 2.46 1.35 2.08 1.39 2.09 2.47 2.06 1.83 
2010 2.23 2.71 1.99 2.78 2.09 2.46 2.80 2.52 2.45 
2011 2.18 2.70 1.64 2.82 2.24 2.41 2.96 2.63 2.45 
2012 1.94 2.73 1.46 2.57 2.17 2.19 2.91 2.65 2.33 
2013 2.24 2.75 1.80 2.62 2.17 2.34 3.03 2.78 2.47 
2014 2.28 3.06 2.14 3.08 2.47 2.56 3.20 3.22 2.75 
2015 2.43 3.05 2.15 3.10 2.35 2.63 3.09 3.22 2.75 
2016 2.31 2.88 2.04 2.96 2.05 2.60 2.90 2.93 2.58 
2017 2.73 3.22 2.64 3.45 2.19 3.02 3.17 3.06 2.94 
2018 2.88 3.47 3.08 3.62 2.40 3.30 3.17 3.15 3.13 
Average 2.31 3.09 2.28 3.06 2.24 2.63 3.15 2.98 2.72 
 
Appendix 11 – Model code in R 
#GJL model functions 
x_function <-function(rf, k, sig_a) { 
  miu <- rf-k  
  a <- sig_a^2/2 
  b <- 2*rf*sig_a^2 
  c <- (miu-a)^2 
  d <- miu-a 
  e <- d+sqrt(c+b) 
  x <- e/sig_a^2  




y_function <- function(rf, k, sig_a) { 
  miu <- rf-k 
  a <- sig_a^2/2 
  b <- 2*rf*sig_a^2 
  c <- (miu-a)^2 
  d <- miu-a 
  e <- d-sqrt(c+b) 
  y <- e/sig_a^2  
  return (y) 
} 
 
#Default Barrier Function  
#found by invoking smooth pasting condition 
v_b_function <- function( rf, k, sig_a, C) { 
  l_d <- x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a) / (x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)+1) 
  V_b <- l_d*C*(1/rf) 




p_b_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  R<- v_a/v_b_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C) 
  p_b <- R^(-1*x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)) 
  return ((R>1)*p_b+(R<=1)*10^10) 





v_non_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C ){ 
  v_non <- (1-p_b_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C ))*C/rf  




v_solv_function <- function(v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  v_solv <- v_a - v_b_function( rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C )*p_b_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, 
k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C)  
  return(v_solv) 
} 
 
e_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C, TaxCorp, TaxDiv){ 
  Tx_eff <- (1-TaxCorp)*(1-TaxDiv) 
  return(Tx_eff*(v_solv_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C)-v_non_function ( 











Time   <- xpto[,0]        
date    <- as.numeric(xpto[,1]) 
EBT     <- as.numeric(xpto[,2]) 
Equity  <- as.numeric(xpto[,3]) 
Non     <- as.numeric(xpto[,4]) 
RF      <- as.numeric(xpto[,6])*0.01 
 
 
FindV <- function(x, k, sig_a, TimeM) { 
  ModelEquity<-e_function(v_a=x, rf=RF[TimeM], k=k, sig_a, C=Non[TimeM], 
TaxCorp=0.2, TaxDiv=0.2) 
  #print(ModelEquity) 





#Finds the project value that matches equity value 







FindAssetVol <- function (k, Start_sig_a) { 
  Error <- 10^10 
  while (Error > 0.00001){ 
    RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k, sig_a=Start_sig_a) 
    log_ret <- diff(log(RecoveryAssetVec_1),lag=1) 
    sig_a1 <-  sd(log_ret)*sqrt(52)  
    Error<- abs(Start_sig_a-sig_a1)  
    Start_sig_a <- sig_a1 
  } 
  return(sig_a1) 
} 
 
# K as average of  (EBIT+Non)/AssetVector  
Findk<- function(Start_k, sig_a){ 
  Error <- 10^10 
  for (i in 1: 988) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k=Start_k, sig_a) 
      k_a1 <- (sum(EBT[1:988])+sum(Non[1:988]))/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)  
      Start_k <- k_a1 
    } 
  return(k_a1) 
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  return(RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
} 
 
FindEstimates<- function(Start_k, Start_sig){ 
  Error <- 10^10       
  for (i in 1:992) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      sig_a1 <-FindAssetVol(k= Start_k , Start_sig_a= Start_sig )          
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k= Start_k,sig_a= Start_sig )    
      k_a1 <- (sum(EBT[1:988])+sum(Non[1:988]))/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1)     
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)      
      Start_k <- k_a1    
    } 
  return(sig_a1)  
   
}  
 
FindEstimates2<- function(Start_k, Start_sig){ 
  Error <- 10^10       
  for (i in 1:992) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      sig_a1 <-FindAssetVol(k= Start_k , Start_sig_a= Start_sig )          
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k= Start_k,sig_a= Start_sig )    
      k_a1 <- (sum(EBT[1:998])+sum(Non[1:998]))/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1)     
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)      
      Start_k <- k_a1    
    } 
  return(k_a1)  
}  
 
#run the iterative approach at once and safe the values in sig_a & k 
Sig_K <-FindEstimates(Start_k=0.05,Start_sig=0.2) 




k    <- Sig_K1[1]  
 
# Define Market price risk 
EQRP <- as.numeric(xpto[,7])  
beta <- mean(as.numeric(xpto[,8])) 
miu_e<- RF+beta*(EQRP) 
 
#Computing standard deviation of Equity and cleaning from outliers 
sig_e1      <- sd(diff(log(Equity[1: 988]))) 
all_outliers<- diff(log(Equity[1: 988])) 
limits <- 3*sig_e1 
all_outliers<- all_outliers[!(all_outliers> limits)] 
all_outliers<- all_outliers[!(all_outliers< -limits)] 
b           <- boxplot(all_outliers) 
sig_e1      <-sd(all_outliers)*sqrt(52) 
 
Mk_Rsk <- function(EQRP,beta,sig_e1){ 
  Mk_Rsk    <- (beta*EQRP)/sig_e1 
  return(Mk_Rsk) 
} 
Mk_Rsk <- Mk_Rsk(EQRP,beta,sig_e1) 
 
# Sigma as standard deviation of log returns  
Findmiu_a <- function(beta, EQRP, sig_a,Mk_Rsk){ 
  miu_a     <- RF+Mk_Rsk*sig_a 
  return(miu_a) 
} 
miu_a <- Findmiu_a(beta, EQRP, sig_a,Mk_Rsk) 
 
#Find miu_d => drift of the project/process 
miu_d_function <- function(beta,EQRP,sig_e1,sig_a,k,Mk_Rsk){ 
  miu_d     <- RF+Mk_Rsk*sig_a-k 
  return(miu_d) 
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} 
miu_d <- miu_d_function(beta, EQRP, sig_e1,sig_a,k,Mk_Rsk) 
 
#Probability of default function  
 
RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k,sig_a) 
Barrier<- 1: 988 
for(i in 1: 988){  
  Barrier[i]<-v_b_function(rf=RF[i], k, sig_a, C=Non[i]) 
} 
V_b_Ratio <- Barrier / RecoveryAssetVec_1       
max(Barrier/RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
 
#Gives distance to distress at each moment in time 
D2D<-function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time){ 
  Delta_t <- 1/52 
  TimeT   <- 52*years  
  a <- (miu_a - k - (sig_a^2/2)) 
  b <- TimeT*Delta_t 
  c <- log(RecoveryAssetVec_1[Time]/v_b_function(rf=RF[Time], k=k, sig_a=sig_a, 
C=Non[Time])) 
  d <- sig_a*sqrt(b) 
  e<- (c+a*b)/d 
} 
#Gives Probability of V being below V_B at time T (ignores first passage time) 
AuxProbability<-function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time){  
  pnorm(-D2D(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time)) 
} 
#Gives the probability of defaulting in "years"-years at time "Time" 
PDfunc <- function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time) 
{  
  Delta_t <- 1/52 
  TimeT   <- 52*years  
  a <- (miu_a - k - (sig_a^2/2)) 
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  b <- TimeT*Delta_t 
  c <- log(v_b_function(rf=RF[Time], k=k, sig_a=sig_a, 
C=Non[Time])/RecoveryAssetVec_1[Time]) 
  d <- sig_a*sqrt(b) 
  e <- pnorm(((a*b)-c)/d) 
  f <- exp((2/sig_a^2)*a*c)*pnorm(((a*b)+c)/d) 
  g <- e-f 
  return(1-g) 
} 
 
PD_Series <- 1: 988 
D2D_Series <- 1: 988 
PD_Series_aux1 <- 1: 988 
 
#Computes output 
for(i in 1:988){ 
  D2D_Series[i]<-D2D(k, sig_a, miu_a=miu_a[i], years=5,Time=i) 
  PD_Series_aux1[i]<-AuxProbability(k, sig_a, miu_a[i], years=5,Time=i) 




Output <- do.call(rbind.data.frame, Map('c',V_b_Ratio, PD_Series, PD_Series_aux1, 
D2D_Series, RecoveryAssetVec_1, sig_a, k, sig_e1,miu_a,miu_d,miu_e,Mk_Rsk)) 
write.table(Output, file = "new_WFC2.csv",  sep=";", dec = ".") 
